It did not take long to realize that it had not been the War to End All Wars. 1 In heralding the end of formal European imperialism, however, World War I was nonetheless world-altering, though this would take longer to discern. W.E.B. Du Bois, as usual, was ahead of the intellectual curve in grasping the War's significance. As one who had argued since the beginning of the century that white supremacy was a transnational rather than a US phenomenon, Dr. Du Bois was well placed to point out that the war was rooted in empire-building in Africa, and that the contributions of black troops during the conflict made a return to the status quo ante impossible.
The defence of Ethiopia marks a crucial chapter of African American and world history, in which black critiques of political economy and international relations became intertwined during the crucial interwar-era struggle against white supremacy. Moreover, this episode underscores the contributions that African Americans and some leftist whites made to both anticolonial struggles and to the rise of what later came to be known as the Third World. 6 This brew of anticolonial internationalism, antiracism, and a critical approach to capitalism presented a significant challenge to US economic and racial liberalism that would continue into the Cold War.
To show how some of the groundwork had already been laid for the 1935 response among African Americans, in this essay I take up the symbolic significance of Ethiopia, the mass appeal of the UNIA, and the perennial intellectual force of Pan-Africanism. From here, I will emphasize the extent to which the mobilization against Mussolini's aggression was a plebian phenomenon imbued with antiracist and politically leftist ideological content, a point to which the most detailed treatments of these events have paid limited attention. 7 In keeping with historian Glenda Gilmore's argument that the radical left before 1950 "redefined the debate over white supremacy and hastened its end," I want to add to our understanding of African American reactions to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict by documenting how they were constitutive of an interwar confluence of opposition to racial oppression, economic exploitation, and empire. 8 Like Du Bois' own leftwa rd drift between producing his wa rtime analyses and publishing B l a ck Reconstruction in the year of Italy's invasion, many African Americans forged their extant internationalist racial pride during this decade and a half into a potent, popular critique of white supremacy and its imbrication with global capitalism. 9 Symbolic Ethiopia, Pan-Africanism, and the UNIA provided elements of this critique; the relatively open class war of the Depression enabled its mobilization.
Ethiopia: A Transatlantic Symbol
Ethiopia did not suddenly come to symbolize Africa when Mussolini's military forces began their invasion, nor was African American interest in the country new in 1935. In the ancient Mediterranean world, Homer and Herodotus both at times used "Ethiopia," or "aithiops" to refer to lands inhabited by people whose skin was darker than that of most Greeks and Romans. 10 While European interest in "Ethiopia" may have been part of that increasingly rigid separation between Orient and Occident that for Edward Said "seems bold by the time of the Iliad," the entangled trajectories of peoples and their cultures that characterized the Atlantic world gave Ethiopia perennial significance through both European and African traditions. 11 When, for example, Vasco Nunez de Balboa allegedly encountered a "tribe of Ethiopians" in Panama in 1513, he was unclear as to whether this was a group of escaped slaves from Haiti. It was equally unclear from which region of Africa they originated. 12 But Balboa's terminology indicates that Ethiopia served as a geographic metonym for Africa from the earliest days of American-European-African contact.
For Africans in the Americas, Ethiopia continued to act as a symbol for Africa as a whole since the Christian Bible became a definitive influence on the enslaved peoples and their descendants. 13 In Jamaica, where the name Ethiopia became identified with salvation, an ex-slave founded the Ethiopian Baptist Church in 1784, the island's first Baptist church. 14 In the United States, the biblical verse Psalms 68:31, "Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God" became a scriptural basis for a prophetic interpretation of Ethiopia's role in history. From Robert Alexander Young and David Walker in the Jacksonian period, to Henry Highland Garnet, Martin R. Delany, Edward Blyden, and Alexander Crummell in subsequent decades, influential black thinkers accorded Ethiopia great significance throughout the nineteenth century. part of African American folk thought and popular history, and extant proEthiopian sensibilities were heightened in 1896 when Italy suffered a decisive military defeat by Ethiopians under Menelik II at the battle of Adwa. 16 This popular interest in Ethiopia continued into the 1920s and 1930s, and ensured that when Italian fascists physically threatened Ethiopia's sovereignty, a good number of African Americans considered their own homeland to be under attack. 17 During the interwar period, Ethiopia's emblematic stature established it as part of the African American imagined community's cultural and historic memory. This historic memory jogged other streams of black internationalism in 1935, from the "Resistance at home, resistance abroad" slogan promulgated by the nascent black press in its abolitionist campaigns during the Civil War, to international solidarity campaigns and a general tendency among black intellectuals to perceive and write about domestic phenomena from a global perspective. 18 These instances of black internationalism represented African American interest in the global scene and white supremacy's role in structuring it. Pan-Africanist, nationalist, and later antifascist influences also activated this memory of Ethiopia's significance into defensive action when Italy invaded in 1935.
On the interwar cultural front, Ethiopia was celebrated through a renewed spirit of antiracist militancy and international solidarity. A variety of black artists in 1920s Harlem utilized artistic media to supplant white society's derogatory stereotypes of African and African American cultures. The arts took on strategic importance since whites had effectively blocked the doors to African American economic and electoral participation in American society. 19 Traveling musical ensembles, such as the Salem Tutt Whitney and J. Homer Tutt Company, who in 1920 presented a show advertising its tracing "the origination of Jazz back to the ancient Ethiopians," further demonstrating the reach of interest in Ethiopia as well as the political content of cultural production. 20 Interwar black culture's engag ement with politics and the economy becomes clearer when we recall that the New Negro movement was an intrinsic component of migration from the South. Approximately two million African Americans left the South between 1900 and 1930. 21 These migrants sought new opportunities bringing, in Alain Locke's phrasing, "a new vision of opportunity, of social and economic freedom, of a spirit to seize, even in the face of an extortionate and heavy toll, a chance for the improvement of conditions." 22 Toni Morrison's unforgettable image of Jazz's characters Joe and Violet Trace dancing their way into "the City" aboard a train captured Locke's notion of seizing "a chance for the improvement of conditions," because the decision to move was not only a push from the South but also a pull to a place where racism and poverty could be openly opposed and perhaps ultimately overcome. 23 The cultural production of wh at became known as the Harl e m Renaissance was a part of this bold willingness to seize opportunities, however limited, available in the US after 1918. The cultural bloom of the 1920s and 1930s did not overturn the structures of oppression that surrounded it, but these decades were a time when new sites of resistance and spaces of relative freedom were carved out. Since Ethiopia constituted such a pervasive symbol, it makes sense to think of African American reactions to war in that land as one important instance of what literary scholar Huston Baker has called the "profoundly beneficial effects for areas of A f ro-American discours e " in the Harlem Renaissance era .
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In the interwar whirlwind of cultural activity, political expectations, and global realities, the Pan-African movement, the UNIA, and the CPUSA attempted to address the concerns of the black community and participate in its mobilization against domestic and transnational oppression.
The Pan-African Congresses and the UNIA
In the shadow of the great power deliberations at Versailles, fifty-seven influential black delegates met in 1919 at the Grand Hotel in Paris for the convening of the first Pan-African Congress. The second Congress was held in London in August of 1921, with sessions in Brussels and Paris, and was followed by a third Congress in Lisbon in 1923 and a fourth in New York in 1927. 25 These gatherings, with their attendant speeches and resolutions, achieved little in tangible terms. They were nevertheless a significant component of black internationalism in the years before Italy invaded Ethiopia: the fact that the meetings took place at all was an accomplishment. That the Congresses brought together figures of the African diaspora whose intellectual leadership would keep the international context on the agenda of the black freedom struggle is a difficult achievement to measure, but one that undoubtedly played a crucial role during the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. One prescient resolution from the 1927 Congress, for example, demanded the continued independence of Ethiopia.
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The Pan-Africanism of the Congresses shared many of the same concerns of the more populist UNIA; each demanded equality for African Americans as part of an ove rall movement that sought justice for all the peoples o f Africa and the diaspora .
Yet the elite character of the Congresses placed distance between their high-minded resolutions and the aspirations of the black majority. 27 During the 1920s, they preferred to express their diasporic solidarity through the Universal Negro Improvement Association. Marcus Garvey rose to the fore of black politics in the US during the aftermath of the East St. Louis massacre of 1917, the Red Summer of 1919's white mob attacks on twenty-six black communities, and the resulting growth of black resistance. African Americans enthusiastically responded to Garvey's call for a mass mobilization of the peoples of Africa and the diaspora. His appeals to the black working class, his schemes to promote black wealth, his flair for pageantry and compelling rhetoric, his plans for repatriation, and his strong repudiation of the tenets of white supremacy brought Garvey respect and expanded the UNIA to as many as four million members worldwide. 28 The fact that the politics of the Garvey's organisation was more populist than that of the Pan-African Congresses did not by any measure mean that the UNIA was socialist in orientation. Indeed, as Colin Grant points out in his textured biography of Garvey, it was rather ironic that the Bureau of Investigation-who, thanks to the efforts of the young J. Edgar Hoover, saw Reds everywhere in the aftermath of World War I-attempted to pin Bolshevik labels on an individual so entrepreneurial in orientation. 29 Black nationalism was not socialism, but as we will see, both would later intersect in unexpected ways.
The UNIA reached its zenith in the early 1920s, after which internal and external problems brought about the rapid decline of the movement and the downfall of Garvey himself.
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But many former UNIA members would still have been alive just over a decade later, and the racial pride that flourished at the height of this organization was sustained for generations. Garvey's emphasis on Africa, and particularly Ethiopia, laid the groundwork for the mobilization against Italy's invasion. As historian Alberto Sbacchi notes, "Ethiopia filled the vacuum left by the eclipsed Garvey movement." Despite the apparent incongruity between the Marxism of the CPUSA and the black nationalism of the UNIA, there were important similarities between these outfits. Black nationalist ideas had enjoyed currency within US Party circles almost since its inception, as exemplified by Audley Moore, who became a Party leader during the 1930s while remaining a dues-paying member of the UNIA.
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Like one of its other main competitors, the NAACP, the CPUSA functioned as an unpredictable social movement as often as it did a highly disciplined institution, meaning that coalitions, factions, and individuals often fo rmu l ated theory and praxis in ways that the leadership could not dire c t ly contro l . Though the UNIA was undeniably dedicated to racial issues, it was also a movement that touched on class relations, since black populations throughout the Atlantic world were almost always of the working class. UNIA ideology, especially after the 1910s, could be quite conservative in terms of gender roles and economic programs, but even its entrepreneurialism was largely abandoned by what remained of the organization after the 1920s to compete with the Communists for African American working class allegiance.
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The Depression gave rise to new vocabularies of economic critique that made possible the specifically leftist orient ation of the movement in the 1930s that was not yet emergent during Garvey ' s heyd ay.
" The Kind of Vast Support that Ethiopia Enjoyed Amongst Black s Everywhere"
In the 1930s, when Italian statesmen began to follow public rumblings about MunroEthiopia with specific pronouncements of its designs on the African nation, member states of the League of Nations were unwilling to act, even when threats and provocations proceeded to outright invasion in October of 1935. 35 Italian designs on Ethiopia were longstanding; the prestige of colonial possessions and military revenge for Italian humiliation at Adwa in 1896 fit nicely into Mussolini's visions of fascist grandeur and a new Roman Empire. The British, French, and US governments, like that of Italy, were motivated by imperial concerns rather than by international law. The British and French governments were also particularly worried about alienating Italy in ways that might strengthen Mussolini's relations with Hitler's Germany. As George Padmore put it, "[t]he drama which opened in Berlin ended in Addis Ababa," and the Italian military dispensed aerial bombardments and poison gas on the Ethiopian people unimpeded by ex t e rnal diplomatic constra i n t s. For those who did not assume the logic of imperialism, Italy's claims were unconvincing. But since no sincere attempts to halt Mussolini were forthcoming from powerful states, counteraction against Italian fascism worked from the bottom up. The CPUSA took an interest in these developments. During the Depression, the CPUSA had established itself as a significant ally in the struggle against white supremacy, imperialism, and capitalist exploitation. The Party also benefitted from the great extent to which the mobilization in defense of Ethiopia was a popular phenomenon that already shared an affinity with the CPUSA's antifascist tactics and ideology. 37 As the Italian government's invasion plans became increasingly evident, so did the anticolonial opposition throughout the Atlantic world; these activities comprised a transcontinental context for events within the United States. In South Africa, protesters in Durban burned Mussolini in effigy while others rallied in Cape Town.
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Walter Kumalo, an important Zulu chief who had served in France during Wo rld War I, tried to establish a military fo rce to aid Ethiopia. Approximately 6,000 Africans petitioned the South African authorities for permission to enlist in Ethiopia's army. These requests were denied because British subjects were forbidden to serve in armies warring against nations with which Britain was at peace. 39 In West Africa, the Nigerian Youth Movement built on existing anti-imperialist sentiment to link calls for Ethiopia's defence to demands for selfgovernment from British rule. 40 There were also protest activities in the Caribbean. These activities were reported in the black press, and monitored by the British Foreign Office, whose agents reported on mass meetings and circulating petitions in places like St. Lucia and Jamaica. 41 Not only did 1935 witness the Caribbean's black population coming to Ethiopia's defense. That year also saw the beginning of a massive strike wave, itself in part the product of existing pro-Ethiopia mobilizations, which spread across the islands and the African continent. These developments forced the labour question onto the British and French imperial agendas, ultimately paving the road to decolonization. 42 In the British imperial metropole, parallel pro-Ethiopia mobilizations were underway. Exiled in London, Marcus Garvey took up a spirited campaign against the invasion through his journal, The Blackman. 43 In 1935, the International African Friends of Ethiopia was formed in London to consider sending a volunteer force to repel the invasion. The IAFE's executive committee included George Padmore, with Jomo Kenyatta serving as secretary, Amy Ashwood Garvey as treasurer, and C.L.R. James as chairperson. 44 Ras Makonnen, originally of British Guiana, joined the group after being deported from Denmark for his antifascist agitation there. Makonnen's description of his experience with the IAFE provides an insightful example of the popular nature of the responses to the crisis:
It's very important to put the response of the black world to the Ethiopian War into perspective, especially since it is easy to get the impression that panAfricanism was just some type of petty protest activity -a few blacks occasionally meeting in conference and sending resolutions here and there. But the real dimensions can only be gathered by estimating the kind of vast support that Ethiopia enjoyed amongst blacks everywhere. We were only one center, the International African Friends of Ethiopia, but that title was very accurate. Letters simply poured into our office from blacks on three continents asking where could they register. "I've got money." Letters simply poured into our office from blacks on three continents asking where could they register. I've got money. I can pay my fare across to Ethiopia and I'll buy my own rifle even. Indeed, if researchers would care to consult the columns of a paper like the Chicago Defender of that year they would find countless letters from ordinary blacks all over North America. 45 Indeed, Makonnen's portrayal of London also encapsulated the mood in the African American press coverage of the crisis. 46 In the aftermath of Reconstruction's broken promise and Woodrow Wilson's narrow understanding of what making "the world safe for democracy" entailed, black newspaper readerships expected greater militancy from the publications that they supported. 47 Early in the century, African American newspapers were more likely to reflect Booker T. Washington's politics than those of W.E.B. Du Bois, but by the Depression, the black press entered its "golden age," during which the economic crisis inspired renewed critical commentary on the events of the day. And as nationally circulated weeklies, the Pittsburgh Courier, the New York Amsterdam News, and the Chicago Defender represented the most cosmopolitan politics in black America. 48 In 1935, as during the entire interwar period, African Americans looked to the black press for information since papers produced across the colour line often reflected the perspectives of capital and white society. By the 1930s, when, as Cedric Robinson claims, "the rise of Italian Fascism occasioned a militant opposition among the Black American masses," coverage of the Ethiopian situa-tion in the papers of the black press and the white left occurred in an environment of extensive antifascist activism throughout the country. 49 In response to the call to defend Ethiopia, groups such as the academic Ethiopia Research Council, the Popular Front's Provisional Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia, and the nationalist African Patriotic League and Pan-African Reconstruction Association were formed, as were numerous other US-based organizations. 50 In addition to associations based in African American communities, some sectors within organized labour loudly criticized the Italian government's actions. At a labour conference orga n i zed by socialists Frank Cro s swaith and A . Philip Ra n d o l p h , International Ladies Garment Workers Union Vice President Luigi Antonini denounced fascist aggression against Ethiopia to sustained applause. Others took direct action, such as refusing to load ships that could supply the Italian forces, thereby giving substance to labour's antifascist sloganeering.
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Antifascist and anticolonial activism also took place on many college campuses. 52 Howard University in Washington, DC, was one centre of activity for engaged students and faculty. Black intellectuals maintained campus interest in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular during the 1930s through the Ethiopian Research Council and through related activities. 54 In New York, the Universal Ethiopian Students Association, an organization of high school seniors, college, and graduate students, was active throughout the 1930s. Inspired by Garvey's UNIA, they corresponded with some of the central figures working on the Ethiopian issue. They also organized public community events such as evening summer courses in African history, a mock trial entitled "Africa vs. the Imperialist Powers," and a "momentous debate" over the assertion that "Western civilization is detrimental to the black man's progress." 55 Student demonstrations occurred in many parts of the United States during the crisis. On 8 November, campus rallies involving white supporters of Ethiopia took place at Columbia University in New York, Brooklyn College, New York University, the YMCA in Richmond, Virginia, Randolph-Macon Women's College in Lynchburg, Virginia, Penn State College in Pennsylvania, Howard University, the University of Chicago, and at Bucknell University in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.
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As Ras Makonnen indicated, letters to the editor are also an excellent source of black opinion regarding the conflict. By no means did the Defender hold a monopoly on concerned subscribers. In his 9 May "Day by Day" in the Baltimore Afro-American, William N. Jones remarked that "Most impressive of all communications coming to this column this week are letters from young men and women throughout the country offering cooperation in any plan in which they can help in the Abyssinian situation." Widespread youth interest in the crisis indicates that New Negro militancy of the post-World War I years continued to appeal to younger African Americans in the Depression. On the same page, the "Afro Readers Say" section printed letters entitled "Ready to Go," "Ready to Fight," and "We Await Word from Abyssinia." The phrasing of one letter from Detroit clearly demonstrated the enduring legacy of the UNIA: "We have been told of what is happening in Abyssinia. We heard of this 15 years ago, but we didn't believe it. Marcus Garvey told us of the very same thing now happening. There are millions of us, and if we can get there, we are willing to fight for Abyssinia. It is our country. We should have one God, one aim, one destiny." Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which these were the views of individuals as opposed to those who might have been putting forward perspectives from particular organizations, these letters certainly illustrated a broad compass of concern. Such expressions continued throughout the year, finally dissipating in 1936 when it became apparent that the Italian offensive was irreversible.
This overwhelming concern over Ethiopia's independence indicates the internationality of African American racial pride, which, taken together with the intense attention fixed on the Joe Louis-Primo Carnera boxing match of 26 June, gave credence to black nationalism and leftist antifascism. Louis handily defeated "Mussolini's Darling" at their Yankee Stadium engagement, which translated into a symbolic defeat of Italian imperialism. This victory also propelled Louis as a black celebrity who would come to embody the hopes of democracy against fascism for many in the United States as Mussolini and especially Hitler sought to forcefully expand their spheres of influence. 59 Although the major publications of the African American press had varying editorial positions on the issues of the day, they were uniform in their continued sympathetic coverage of the Ethiopian story. This convergence of reporting regarding the crisis was undoubtedly driven by the readership, especially in a period when subscriptions were more important than advertising revenue. In the more conservative New York Amsterdam News, the readership similarly expressed its support for Ethiopia. Letters such as "Italy and Ethiopia" on 2 March, "Would Fight for Africa" on 16 March, and "Recruits Get Ready to Serve in Ethiopia" (a call for volunteers from Walter J. Davis, a Fort Worth, TX, veteran) on 20 July revealed not only readership disquiet but also a determination to actively thwart Mussolini's plans if possible.
Predictably, the Chicago Defender's subscriber correspondence exhibited a similar tone, and the Pittsburgh Courier also received a deluge of mail on the subject. In the 27 July "What the People Think" section of the Courier, for example, thirty letters about Ethiopia crowded the page. This outpouring of readership sentiment was reflected in, and helps explain, the extent of the coverage on Ethiopia in all of these papers.
Ethiopia was the story of the year in the black press in 1935. Articles from early in the crisis emphasized the view that Ethiopia had defeated Italy before, and therefore ought not to be written off as a military lightweight. A 16 February Defender piece on Ethiopia's unwillingness to submit to Italian threats represented an editorial angle which became more common as war neared and finally arrived.
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These papers were persistent in their attempts to establish that Ethiopia, contrary to stereotypes perpetuated about all of Africa in the white media, was a "modern" rather than a "backward" nation. 61 This sentiment was epitomized by a 23 November photograph of Haile Selassie in the Baltimore AfroAmerican accompanied by the caption "Nothing If Not Modern." The Chicago Defender told readers that Mussolini ought to "watch his step" if he was seriously considering an invasion, and that Ethiopia's artillery was prepared to repel Italian aggression, while the Pittsburgh Courier reported on the "flood of modern arms and ammunition pouring into Haile Selassie's kingdom." 62 In a related theme, the black press maintained a positive appraisal of Ethiopia's military performance for as long as possible in the face of Italy's ultimately superior forces. New York Amsterdam News readers were informed that Ethiopia was able to "thrash" its foes on the battlefield, the Afro-American carried a headline reading "3,500 Italians Fall as Ethiopians Halt Advances," and Courier subscribers learned of a startling 14,000 Italian casualty figure within weeks of the invasion. 63 Undeniably, inflated journalistic diction often obscured the realities of Ethiopia's slim chances of victory. 64 When Ethiopian defeat became manifest, however, these papers shifted focus increasingly to fascist brutality. 65 Apart from reporting on the conflict itself, the black press also highlighted support for Ethiopia from within the United States. Although the US government prohibited military assistance to Ethiopia, and the pecuniary realities of the Depression severely curtailed financial contributions, opponents of the invasion found venues in which to express their politics beyond the editorial page. American Aid for Ethiopia-a mostly white group led by prominent religious figures and philanthropists-raised an ambulance and a ton of medical supplies. 68 Mass meetings, public talks, and demonstrations-often organized by the Communist Party-were reported in Boston, Birmingham, Pittsburgh, Mobile, Detroit, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Cincinnati, New Brunswick, Buffalo, St. Louis, Passaic, Omaha, Seattle, New Orleans, and Indianapolis. 69 Two women chained themselves to a lamppost at the Italian consulate.
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Protesters splattered an Italian Vice Consul with ink. 71 New York and Chicago were the natural nuclei of opposition to Italian fascism. As the two major terminus cities of African American migration from the South, these urban centers had witnessed militant antiracism during the UNIA's zenith; that spirit lived on in the public expressions of rage at Mussolini's imperialism. In Chicago, various actions were organized, the most dramatic of which was the 1 September march in which 750 police attacked the crowd and arrested 300 demonstrators, with Communists Harry Haywood and Thomas McKenna prominent among them.
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In New York, fundraising events, wellattended lectures, and mass rallies involving black and white participants took place throughout the crisis period.
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Sometimes the scale of these proceedings even caught the attention of the New York Times, which was generally unsympathetic to the left or the needs and aspirations of the black community.
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"Turn Your Guns Against the Fascist Leaders, Assassins and Robbers"
Ras Makonnen's depiction of London could easily be transferred to the United States. Where, then, did the CPUSA stand amid this widespread configuration of pro-Ethiopian interest? Despite its undemocratic internal structure and political culture, the Party was not marginal to the popular pro-Ethiopia effort. 75 Just as the UNIA appealed to working-class African Americans because its community presence differentiated it from the reformist impulses of traditional black leadership groups, the CP enjoyed a measure of popularity in the 1930s because of its confrontational posture and its willingness to take up significant "local" issues such as tenant advocacy in New York, sharecropper organizing in Alabama, and the Scottsboro and Angelo Herndon cases. 76 These efforts exemplified Communist concentration on African American cadre building, a task necessary to fostering meaningful proletarian unity, but also one that would require, in the words of one internal document, that "we must wipe out every shred of fascist white chauvinism from the ranks of the Party." 77 The point worth emphasizing here is not that the diverse black community adopted the CPUSA's given line at a particular moment. Rather, the Party was one important institutional location through which, in Nikhil Singh's words, black activists proved "remarkably flexible and nondoctrinaire in choosing the vehicles and instruments of their radicalism." 78 Furthermore, to think about the relationship between the CPUSA and the black community as a unidirectional one in which the former exerted its influence on the latter is a misreading on two counts: it occludes the overlap of people and ideas between black and red constituencies, and it obscures how much Communists we re influenced by African American proximity to and part i c i p ation in Pa rty activ i t i e s.
Although international analyses were not new to the black community in the 1930s, African Americans and their allies both within and outside the Party were elaborating the class content of their anticolonial critique after the Italian invasion. As Penny Von Eschen explains, "At the heart of anticolonialists' core set of beliefs was a conception of democracy that embraced the struggles of colonial peoples and saw black peoples as part of the laboring classes of the world." 79 Similarly, literary responses to the conflict by black writers such as Langston Hughes and Melvin Tolson moved from racial pride toward class consciousness. 80 In Hughes' case, his class analysis would inform his coverage of the Spanish Civil War for the Baltimore Afro-American in 1937, thereby contributing to the proliferation of antifascist politics within the African American community while also reflecting the increasingly pro-socialist perspective of the black press in the late 1930s. 81 In general, a political economy approach to global white supremacy was a significant legacy of the mobilization of 1935. The attraction that the explanatory power of leftist ideologies held for African Americans during the Depression in part accounts for the vigour with which liberals and conservatives would attempt to curtail these ideas after 1945.
In keeping with their increasing outspokenness about the links between international and domestic systems of inequality, African Americans grew increasingly critical of economic hierarchies "behind the veil" within the United States during the Popular Front period. 82 This is not to suggest that race receded into the background as class occupied the main stage. Instead, African American racial consciousness was augmented by greater attention to domestic and international class dynamics during the crisis, thereby meshing their perspectives with those of rank-and-filers in the CPUSA. Such heightened class consciousness was in part the result of straightened circumstances brought about by the Depression, but the Communist Party played a role in making available a particular articulation of resulting grievances. Black acceptance of class-based ideas and, more importantly, appreciation for the Communists' willingness to combat white supremacy head on was not contingent upon Party membership. In Harlem, Adam Clayton Powell Jr. undoubtedly represented many in his congregation and community when he stated that regarding "the Negro," "[h]e appreciated the Communists for their unceasing efforts on his behalf. He will support common causes, join willingly in united fronts, fight side by side in every crusade, but he does not join the Party." 83 Overall, the CPUSA enjoyed some success in the black community because its outright contestation of the colour line resonated with the militancy of working-class, and some middle-class, African Americans.
Considering that antifascists incisively underscored the white supremacist links between imperialism in the global arena and the collective insult of segrega-tion in the United States, it is hardly surprising that race constituted a fundamental lens through which black activists viewed the crisis. What is perhaps more striking is the extent to which a class analysis and indeed Communism itself was an element of black anticolonial discourse. CPUSA tactics of mass mobilization included African Americans in a type of bottom-up organizing that contrasted with anything that more established elements of the black community had to offer. And since the 1935 crisis arose in the aftermath of an elitist approach to US involvement in Liberia and Haiti that laid bare the NAACP's class specific politics, African Americans were ready to embrace the type of popular mobilization that the CPUSA embodied. 84 Building on the tradition of "uplifting the race," the black middle class often fought racism through available means under unfavourable circumstances. Although they at times considered adopting the kind of analysis promoted by the CP, the African American leadership class' emphasis on respectability ensured that the Party would continue to have a distinct, though never immense, appeal for the black working class. 85 Communist efforts in aid of Ethiopia did result in some recruitment among African Americans. Howard "Stretch" Johnson, an artist and intellectual who became a key cultural worker in Party circles, was introduced to the CPUSA through their work on the Ethiopian issue, which in turn led him to conclude that "the more Communists I met, the more I liked what they had to say and what they were doing. Because I saw that of all the people who were talking about solving problems and programs and so forth, when there was a picket line, they were out in front." 86 Johnson's account was not representative, but also not entirely exceptional.
Thus, African Americans were unwilling to join the party in large numbers, but the CPUSA did provide a style of leadership not available from traditional middle class leaders. The Party certainly squandered some of its support through Maxim Litinov's silence at the League of Nations regarding Italy's aggression, by covert Soviet oil, coal, tar, and wheat sales to Italy, and by the NAACP's public exposure of both. 87 Just like the governments of Britain, France, and the United States, Soviet diplomacy was guided by "national interests" as the state defined them, which in Russia's case meant containing Germany's growing threat more than it meant opposing imperialism and maintaining a principled defense of a relatively powerless nation. The relationship between the CPUSA and the Comintern, however, was not always one in which the directives of the latter absolutely determined the membership's behaviour in the former. In reality, the NAACP's eagerness to expose Soviet duplicity at the League of Nations was not only a genuine attempt to show that Communist leaders did not always put black interests first, but was also as a strategic maneuver in the contest for bl a ck leaders h i p, a contest in wh i ch the CP was a leg i t i m ate contender.
The opposition to Italy's imperialist enterprise regularly featured in the Communist Party's Daily Worker, with coverage of the urgent situation brewing overseas and the reaction in the United States beginning early in the year.
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The paper also encouraged its majority white readership to see Ethiopia's struggle, and that of their fellow black citizens, as a central element of their own confrontation with capitalist exploitation. A 4 April editorial urged readers: "Every worker, every friend of the colonial masses and the people of Ethiopia, every enemy of Fascism, will rally to the support of the defensive actions of the Ethiopian government." 89 The Communist Party of Italy, itself exiled in Paris during this period, was also developing an antifascism that opposed empire, as exemplified in one of its communications reprinted in the Daily Worker: "Keep away from Africa! Don't shoot your brothers, the Ethiopian people. Embrace the Ethiopians as your brothers. Turn your guns against the fascist leaders, assassins and robbers."
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American re a de rs, bl a ck and wh i t e, we re to consider this message as ap p lying dire c t ly to them also.
But did any of the Party's efforts have an impact on how African Americans perceived the conflict? If the black press is any indication, it seems that the CPUSA was moving into the black mainstream during this period. The Baltimore Afro-American was particularly friendly to the Party, and, like other papers, published stories that held the Soviet Union's lack of segregation up as a model worth emulating. Such stories often featured an African American celebrity's reception in Russia, or presented a photograph of racially integrated groups, but the editorial slant was generally positive, and such coverage continued after the NAACP's exposure of Soviet betrayal at the League. Indeed, evidence of growing CP legitimacy during the Italo-Ethiopian confrontation could be found in the Association's own publication, The Crisis. The monthly's May, 1935 edition accorded prominent coverage to CPUSA theorist James Allen's response to the question "Which Way Out for the Negro?," part of a forum on solutions to living conditions under the Jim Crow order. Allen offered a standard reiteration of the Party line on self-determination in the Black Belt, which prompted a letter from NAACP Field Secretary William Pickens, indicating that he found the piece "very interesting and enlightening," while its implications raised some doubts. 91 The African American press carried stories about the Party that were not directly related to Ethiopian defense activities, indicating the extent to which the CPUSA, in part because of the Scottsboro case, but also because of other local i n i t i at ive s, had become part of bl a ck mainstream discourse during the Depression.
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There were also articles emphasizing the racial dimension of the crisis and of reactions to it in the US, and by no means were all African Americans enamored with communism. Indeed, racial violence between African and Italian Americans did take place in 1935 specifically because of international events. 93 These incidents are not surprising, because historical investments in whiteness created such strong barriers to interracial solidarity, and because although there were numerous visible and vocal Italian antifascists, most Italian Americans supported the policies of their home country. 94 The debate about the CPUSA also took place in editorial columns and letters to the editor. Views about communism were seriously discussed in the major papers of the black press, indicating that CPUSA ideology existed within a range of respectable, debatable ideas. 95 Again, the point here is not that African Americans rallied behind the Party in droves, but rather that Party perspectives were an important aspect of debates within the African American community as to what strategies best suited the freedom struggle in this moment.
The CPUSA was also an important part of community organizing. In the Chicago pro-Ethiopia march that precipitated violent police reaction, Harry Haywood was a key organizer. In his account of the events, Party members on alternating rooftops would address crowds as they disembarked from "El" stations, and "every time we would outsmart the police, a great roar would go up from the crowd -and every time another arrest was made, they would jeer the c o p s." It was because of acts like these, a c c o rding to Hay wo o d , t h at Communists "had become respected members -even leaders -in the Black commu n i t y." 9 6 The spirit of cooperation that Popular Front antifascism made more likely was evident in the Provisional Committee for the Defense of Ethiopia. The PCDE was one of the first organized responses to the crisis, and it claimed a membership of 15,000. 97 Although this number was probably inflated, the PCDE was a vital component of mobilization efforts; it arranged rallies, coordinated approximately thirty black health professionals into a medical committee, and sent Willis N. Huggins to Geneva in an attempt to urge the League of Nations to take stronger action against the Italian government. 98 The assorted elements of the PCDE had their mutual suspicions, but in the face of the overarching issue of Ethiopian defense, these suspicions were overcome to a surprising extent. Consider Abner Berry, a Communist and PCDE secretary, recounting his experiences when Party members approached nationalists to work together. When a UNIA leader was persuaded to attend an Italian Workers Club meeting, " [t] he Chairman called on him to make a speech. Well, he gave the regular speech that a nationalist would be expected to make, the whole business about Ethiopia, what it stood for, and when he got through, he looked at me indignantly and said, 'Well, I told them.' And then there was this burst of applause, they gave him money, and he never got through talking about it." 99 The episode revealed that although socialism and nationalism should not be conflated as interchangeable forms of resistance, the two were not always and only divergent. Although antifascism provided the movement advocating for Ethiopia with a common political denominator, every participant was not necessarily a self-identified leftist. But each of these political actors helped create a camp aligned around a political cause, within which leftist thinkers held considerable sway in articulating the relationship between opposition to racism, fascism, capital, and empire. These ideas had an effect, especially as they were being put forward by those who had shown themselves to be committed supporters of Ethiopia's cause.
The Within a decade, an attempt to assemble such a diverse group might have appeared naïve or quixotic, but in the early days of the Popular Front, when the threat of fascism meant that choosing between liberalism, nationalism, and communism did not entail a fixed and final decision, possibilities were less predictable.
The Communist Party at times played an off-stage role in the larger black community, but it nevertheless remained influential. This was not only or even primarily because the Party's class struggle ideology spoke to the class divisions in black life. Rather, the CPUSA won supporters because of rank-and-file sincerity in the struggle against racism and poverty. For the Party, the Italo-Ethiopian crisis occurred at a moment when it was reaching out to those with varying ideological proclivities to fight the threat posed by fascism. This confluence of factors placed the Party close to the center of the mass mobilization that occurred in that year. The CPUSA, occupying the political field in tension and coalition with the NAACP, nationalist groups, and liberal humanitarians, was not the only group that gave structured direction to the movement, but it was one to which African Americans of the period gave serious consideration for the purposes of Ethiopia's defense. In the final analysis, a leftist mentalité was an integral part of that coming together of Communist, Pan-Africanist, and nationalist elements that made 1935 s u ch a pivotal year in United Stat e s, and indeed gl o b a l , h i s t o ry.
1935 represents a crossroads in the African American freedom struggle. It was a moment that built upon an internationalist tradition that linked oppression at home with exploitation overseas. It built on these traditions, but it gave public expression to their sentiments like never before. 1935 also foreshadowed the struggles to come during World War Two, the Civil Rights Movement, and the colonized's quest for independence. Italy's aggression had a new fascist twist to it, but there was something very familiar about its themes of white supremacy and economic exploitation. Although African Americans had decried imperialism before, Italy chose to attack not only one of the last remaining independent African nations, but also one whose symbolic import was immeasurable. 
